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Abstract: Equality is a complex concept having a variety of meanings (equal treatment, equal op-
portunities, formal equality, and substantive or de facto equality). Although there are strong similarities 
in the definitions of key concepts related to equality, the EU and other international organisations have 
interpreted and applied them differently. Interpretation by these institutions of the concept of positive 
action, as an expression of the principle of de facto equality, has led to uncertainty and methodological 
confusion. Similarly, despite the undeniable degree of harmonization provided by EU legislation regard-
ing this field, key notions of equality law, among them, the term positive action, are still defined and ap-
plied differently in the various legal systems of the EU Member States. First, this paper provides a com-
parative legal analysis of the concept of equality. Second, it addresses the notion of positive action in EU 
law and, specifically, in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. An analysis of the interpretative 
value of that case law is included in order to provide guidance for the adoption of positive action meas-
ures and potential clashes with the international and national contexts. Finally, recent actions adopted 
by the European Commission to promote gender balance in decision-making positions are presented. 
Keywords: equality, positive action measures, EU law and case law. 
1. Introduction
Equality is a broad and complex concept having a variety of meanings –equal treatment, equal 
opportunities, formal equality, and substantive or de facto equality–, and whose definition involves sev-
eral related concepts, namely: direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, objective justification, and 
positive action, inter alia. Although there are strong similarities in the definition of these key concepts, 
the European Union and other international organisations and courts, such as the European Court of 
Human Rights, have interpreted them differently. Thus, the concept of positive action, as an expression 
of the principle of real or de facto equality, has been understood differently. This plurality of interpreta-
tions has led to some uncertainty and methodological confusion. Also, despite the undeniable degree 
of harmonization provided by the European Union –hereinafter EU– legal framework on this terrain, 
key notions of equality law, including the term positive action, are defined and applied differently in 
the various legal systems of the EU Member States. First, this study provides an analysis of the concept 
of equality and related notions from a comparative law perspective. Second, it addresses the notion of 
*An earlier draft of this article was presented at the 20th International Conference of the Council for European Studies, 
Amsterdam, 26.06.2013, on the panel: ‘Gender Equality in the Labour Market from a European and Comparative Perspective’. 
I wish to thank panel discussant, Bart Vanhercke, Director of the OSE in Brussels, for his valuable comments on that version.
Nuria ElENa ramos martíN PositivE actioN iN Eu GENdEr Equality law: PromotiNG womEN...
Spanish Labour Law and Employment Relations Journal (November 2014), Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 20-33
EISSN 2255-2081 - http://www.uc3m.es/sllerj
21
positive action in EU law specifically in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
–hereinafter, CJEU–. In addition, the interpretative value of case law is discussed, along with clashes 
with the national context. Attention is paid to the controversial Kalanke ruling1 which was clarified and 
relaxed in Marschall.2 Other landmark cases such as Badeck,3 Abrahamsson4, Lommers5, Briheche,6 
Commission versus Greece7, and Roca Álvarez8 –questioning the scope of EU provisions on positive 
action measures– are also assessed.
This paper focuses on positive action measures that have been addressed to female workers. The 
aim of this study is twofold. First, an assessment of the EU legal provisions and the CJEU’s case law 
regarding positive action is undertaken in order to analyse the juridical development of this legal con-
cept and to examine the constrains and limits for adopting this type of measures. Second, the content 
and repercussions of the new EU proposed Directive on binding quotas for women on company boards 
is also attention-worthy.9
2. Different perspectives of the equality principle
Equality is a broad concept with a variety of meanings. Above all, it is a relative concept in the 
sense that any equality judgment implies a comparison between two elements. From a legal point of 
view, the concept of equality presents multiple aspects. Formal equality or equality of treatment is the 
first and most well-known concept. This idea of formal equality is intrinsically linked to the prohibition 
of discrimination and it is summarized by the Aristotelian formula: ‘the equal should be treated equal 
and the unequal in an unequal way’ (Marías Araujo, 1983). Despite the apparent simplicity of this apho-
rism, complications arise when trying to determine what situations are equal or unequal in each particu-
lar case. The examination of the equality of two situations requires a test to compare relevant features 
or characteristics in a specific context –e.g. the employment relationship–. In this context, differences 
based on several pre-determined factors such as gender, religion, race, nationality, etcetera, have been 
traditionally considered discriminatory. Discrimination is, then, a key-concept in the definition of equal-
ity and refers to any systematic detrimental treatment of an individual or a group based on personal or 
social circumstances and/or characteristics.
When dealing with formal equality, a distinction must be made between direct and indirect dis-
crimination.10 Direct discrimination means a different and unfavourable treatment infringing the law 
because it is based directly on an individual’s personal or social circumstances. Thus, the concept of di-
rect discrimination is essentially objective. That explains why, in this context, the intent to discriminate 
or not is irrelevant and justification of discriminatory conduct is not accepted. This is, for example, the 
case of any discriminatory treatment based on pregnancy, which have been considered by the CJEU as 
direct discrimination on grounds of gender since men cannot be pregnant.11 
Conversely, the notion of indirect discrimination refers to practices or measures that, being for-
mally neutral, have unequal consequences for different social groups, producing an adverse impact in 
1 C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen, [1995] ECR I-03051.
2 C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-06363.
3 C-158/97, Georg Badeck and Others, [2000] ECR I-01875.
4 C-407/98, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, [2000] ECR I-05539.
5 C-476/99, H. Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, [2002] I-02891.
6 C-319/03, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, [2004] 
ECR I-8807.
7 C-559/07, Commission v. Greece [2004] ECR I-
8 C-104/09 [2010].
9 EU Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on improving the gender balance among non-
executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures - COM (2012) 614 final.
10 The origin of this distinction can be found in the US legal concept of ‘disparate impact’. See, inter alia: United Paper-
makers & Papermakers v United States, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Grigs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971) y Washington v. 
Davis, 406 U.S. 229 (1976).
11 Case C-177/88, Dekker v VJV-Centrum [1990] ECR I-03941 and Case C-32/93, Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd. 
[1994] ECR I-03567.
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one or more group of people. Therefore, the concept of indirect discrimination underlines the fact that 
someone belongs to a disadvantaged group and reflects the supra-individual dimension of the discrimi-
natory phenomenon. Hence, the comparison in indirect discrimination cases is not established among 
individuals but among groups distinguished by their common features, leading to a delimitation of ge-
neric factors or motives for discrimination. In contrast with direct discrimination, indirect discrimination 
cases allow for objective justifications for the different in treatment. According to the settled case-law of 
the Court Justice, indirect discrimination for the purposes of the gender equal treatment directives arises 
when “a national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, works to the disadvantaged of far more 
women than men.” Such is the case with national legislation that works to the disadvantage of part-time 
workers who have worked part-time for a long time, since, in practice, such legislation inhibits access to 
a retirement pension. If it can be proved by statistical facts that legislation affects women far more than 
men, it follows that such legislation is contrary to the principle of equal treatment for men and women, 
unless it is justified by objective factors that are unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of gender.12
The formal approach to the concept of equality has a basic flaw: It often fails to address the social 
inequalities related to the personal or collective background that is strongly embedded in society. In 
this context, first, the achievement of real or substantive equality requires a legal framework that pro-
tects against discrimination, conceived as a repressive reaction aimed to punish discriminatory conducts 
with sanctions. It is the sort of legal reaction traditionally applied against discrimination, based on ‘an 
individual-complaint led model’ (Fredman, 2005). This type of remedy has the legal consequence of re-
establishing equality by declaring the nullity of discriminatory behaviour and its effects. The problem 
posed by this re-active protection method is that it is not absolutely efficient in overcoming deep-rooted 
discriminatory trends in society. It may be useful in repairing the effects of existing discriminatory treat-
ments but it is an inadequate instrument when it comes to eradicating the tendency to discriminate and 
to combat collective discriminatory phenomena apart from indirect discrimination cases. Regarding 
enforcement and compliance of EU gender equality law, studies show that, at a Member State level, 
the legal systems often set high standards as far as the enforcement of individual rights are concerned, 
whereas collective means of implementation are still not as well developed as required by EU gender 
equality legislation (European Commission, 2010). Taking into account the shortages of the traditional 
regulation on equality in order to correct structural discriminations, new mechanisms to remove persis-
tent social inequalities are necessary. In this context, in promotional activities in favour of disadvantaged 
groups, ‘so-called’ material, real or substantive equality measures come into play. 
Positive action measures provide a tool to fight to the collective dimension of discrimination be-
cause they rely on the ideal of substantive equality of the groups making up society. In order for these 
measures to be applicable, discriminatory treatment is assumed based on the mere fact of belonging to 
a disadvantaged social group instead of considering the unjustified different treatment in relative terms 
through the establishment of an ad hoc comparison basis. Therefore, the notion of ‘de facto’ equality 
implies a positive (promotion) as well as a negative dimension (prohibition). Thus, along with remedies 
designed to tackle discriminatory behaviours, levelling measures are also introduced to eliminate the 
situations of social disadvantage at the origin of the discriminatory treatment. The main obstacle in the 
applicability of these proactive measures is that, considered in isolation, they are in breach of the formal 
prohibition of direct discrimination on grounds of gender. Hence, positive action measures restrict the 
principle of equality for men and women in its formal dimension since they establish distinctions based 
on the traditionally forbidden factors of differentiation (i.e., the gender of the worker). However, the 
adoption of this sort of apparently ‘unequal treatment’ has been justified by the imperative of achieving 
substantive equality of the groups and individuals making up society. A ‘democratic society’ is based 
on the values of diversity and tolerance and forms of positive action are not premised on pre-existing 
discrimination but are justified by the goal of organising societal diversity, so long as these measures are 
proportionate and temporary (Schutter, 2011). In this sense, the strict applicability of the principle of ‘de 
facto’ equality requires the adoption of positive action measures in favour of women in order to correct 
for their disadvantages in employment and labour conditions (Palomeque López, 2003). Bob Hepple 
12 Inter alia, Case C-385/11, Elbal Moreno v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) [2012] ECR.
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discusses ‘transformative equality’ to refer to affirmative action schemes aimed to achieve the redis-
tributive goals of labour law. He maintains that ‘democratic participation’ of those directly affected by 
these measures in the making and implementation of these schemes is central to the idea of transforming 
workplace relations and enhanced equality. (Hepple, 2013)
In summary, positive action measures have been addressed to disadvantaged social groups and 
aim to eradicate the social component of discrimination through the adoption of promotional activities 
that differ from the mere sanctioning of discriminatory actions. In this paper, we examine the hypothesis 
that the positive dimension of equality is restrictively acknowledged in EU legislation and in the CJEU’s 
case law that interprets it. In fact, on several occasions, the CJEU has proclaimed that the result pursued 
by Article 157(4) TFEU and the equal treatment for men and women Directive is substantive equality, 
while limiting the use of this sort of measures.13
3. Historical background and conceptual framework
The obligation to respect fundamental rights as general principles of EU law –including the right 
to equality– has been reinforced by granting legally binding status to the rights, and principles set forth 
in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 6 TUE). The CJEU has held that the national courts, 
when applying EU law, must observe fundamental rights, which include, inter alia, the general principle 
of equality and non-discrimination.14 Moreover, it is widely accepted that aim of positive action measures 
is to eliminate inequalities affecting certain social groups and to prevent disadvantageous treatment which 
is unacceptable from a social redistributive perspective (Radín, 2014). However, even when affirmative or 
positive action measures are admitted by several international law instruments, EU law, and the domestic 
laws of several EU Member States, they are still controversial measures and there are divergent opinions 
among academics and the judiciary regarding their effective use and conceptual definition. 
A revision of the concept of positive action should be initiated, paying due attention to the 
United States of America (hereinafter U.S.) legal order, since the first examples of affirmative action 
measures are found in that legal system. From there, this legal concept extended to other Anglo-Saxon 
common law systems, finally influencing the EU law approach to the principle of substantive equality 
(Peters, 1999).
In the U.S., positive action was first developed in regards to the fight against racial discrimina-
tion in education (Brest, 2000).15 In Brown16, for the first time, the Supreme Court proclaimed the il-
legality of racial segregation in education. This decision was a turnover in U.S. Supreme Court case 
law and in U.S. federal policy. As a result of this judgment, the federal government passed several 
Executive Orders17 that suggested the need to adopt affirmative action measures in favour of Afro-
American citizens. Then, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 196418, while prohibiting the racial and 
sexual discrimination (section 703 a), recognised the admissibility of imposing positive action plans 
(706 g). The legitimacy of this type of measures, in the private sector and on a voluntary basis, was 
recognised in the Griggs19 Supreme Court judgment. Since then, public bodies and private companies 
have used these plans with the goal of eradicating racial segregation. From the field of racial equality, 
these measures have been extended to also combat sexual segregation. Johnson20 is the most relevant 
case, in which affirmative action measures in favour of female workers were considered to be legal. In 
13 Inter alia: C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salariés / Thibault [1998] ECR I-2011; 
Badeck, ‘n. 4 supra’; Abrahamsson, ‘n. 5 supra’; and, C-342/01, Merino Gómez v Continental Industrias del Caucho SA, 
[2004] ECR. I-260. 
14 C-81/05, Cordero Alonso v FOGASA, [2006] ECR I-7569.
15 Inter alia: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 1978. 
16 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 347 US 483, 1954.
17 Executive Order No 11246 ratified in 1965 and develop by the Revised Order No 4 (EO 11375) also included gender in 
its scope in 1968.
18 42 USC, 2000 e-12, 78 Stat. 265. (Reformed by Civil Rights Act 1991).
19 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 US 424, 1971.
20 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1987. 
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this case, the possibility of giving preference to women in promotion in sexually segregated categories 
where women were under-represented was found to be in accordance with the law, if the promoted 
women fulfilled the position’s requirements.
The concept of positive action in U.S. law is connected with the idea of social discrimination. This 
legal construction also has its origins in Supreme Court case law. The Supreme Court rulings concerning 
affirmative action measures relied heavily on both distributive and compensative grounds. Consequent-
ly, it is understood that the aim of positive action policies is to eliminate the racial and sexual barriers 
that hamper the achievement of equality of opportunities for racial minorities and women and obstruct 
the sound integration of all groups in the workplace. The main objective of positive action measures is to 
foster the normal labour force composition that would result from the removal of deep-rooted social dis-
criminatory conducts. In this way, the idea of social discrimination serves to justify the adoption of posi-
tive action measures. Therefore, for a positive or affirmative action measure to be justified; it would be 
sufficient to prove the existence of an imbalance in the workforce originated by the under-representation 
of certain groups of workers, without the need to reveal current discriminatory conduct. Furthermore, 
the compensatory values that inspired affirmative action measures are reflected in the remedies granted 
to victims of present discrimination. Affirmative action measures are, then, configured as a collective 
remedy, designed to compensate for generalized unjustified unequal treatment and aimed to eradicate 
systematic discrimination. 
From a legal point of view, an analysis of the concept of positive action measures reveals a very 
wide interpretation, consisting of a large range of measures, including public and private employment 
benefits, improvements in working conditions, policies facilitating reconciliation of working and fam-
ily life, or proactive action measures in strict sense, adopted in favour of disadvantaged social groups. 
This last type of measures implies preferential treatment in access to employment and/or promotions. It 
has been argued that only this last group of measures should be called ‘positive action’ (Sierra Hernáiz, 
1999). The other measures against segregation in employment are considered to be ‘protecting action’ 
or ‘equal opportunities policies’. This last category would comprise the legal framework for protec-
tion of pregnancy and maternity as well as some benefits addressed to only a reduced number of social 
groups. In the specific case of female workers, these equal opportunities policies are focused on the 
elimination of the typical motives of female labour segregation and discrimination without questioning 
the distribution of care and domestic tasks in the household or the patriarchal structure of society as a 
whole (Weldon-Johns, 2013). From the point of view of achieving ‘de facto’ equality, the efficiency of 
these measures is dubious, in the sense that they tend to perpetuate the existing intrinsically unequal di-
vision of social tasks.21 Some measures designed to stimulate female labour market participation may, 
at the same time, contribute to reinforce the existing division of social roles between men and women 
since they maintain the traditional position of females as primary care providers without questioning 
the legitimacy of the overall social structure (Rosenfeld, 1991). This is the case, for example, with 
policies facilitating part-time work for female employees or publicly subsidised nursery places made 
available only for the children of female workers. They have been defined as ‘archaic’ positive action 
measures due to the fact that they do not promote a rupture with the currently prevailing division of 
labour and family tasks (Fernández López, 1991). On the contrary, these measures do not confront the 
imbalanced distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women. They are mainly intended 
to support the position of those individuals belonging to the disadvantaged group in their attempt to 
adjust to the male breadwinner worker pattern. These measures providing equality of opportunities are, 
therefore, a necessary first stage, but they are not suitable to accomplish the aim of substantive equal-
ity among the groups constituting the society. In a second stage, more radical measures attacking the 
gendered division of social roles are required in order to reach a more egalitarian society. These more 
radical measures, positive action measures –quotas and targets–, use more drastic means, i.e. giving 
priority in access, promotion, or continuity in employment to workers belonging to the disadvantaged 
group, in order to increase their labour market participation and provide higher gender balance in 
decision-making positions. 
21 Lommers, n. 6 supra. 
Nuria ElENa ramos martíN PositivE actioN iN Eu GENdEr Equality law: PromotiNG womEN...
Spanish Labour Law and Employment Relations Journal (November 2014), Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 20-33
EISSN 2255-2081 - http://www.uc3m.es/sllerj
25
Both types of measures, the equal opportunities policies and the positive action measures strictu 
sensu –preferential treatment–, have been considered by the CJEU for inclusion in the ‘measures provid-
ing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational 
activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers’. Nevertheless, when 
addressing the legitimacy of equal opportunities policies that restrict advantageous treatment to female 
workers regarding entitlement to child-care leave, breastfeeding leave, extension of period of services 
per child, CJEU case law has evolved from a more permissive policy to a stricter scrutiny of the justifica-
tions behind the exclusion of male workers from the entitlement to these rights.22 
4. Positive action measures in European Union Law
4. 1. The EU regulation of positive action measures
In EU law, positive action measures have been traditionally considered as an exception to the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women. This is the approach of several EU provisions, namely, 
former Article 2(4) of Council Directive 76/207/ECC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and 
working conditions;23 Article 3 of the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC on equal treatment for men and 
women in employment;24 and Article 157.4 TFEU. These provisions have permitted derogations from 
the concept of formal equality and have opened the way for national measures in the form of positive 
action in favour of women in order to promote equal opportunity for men and women.
For more than two decades, the only existing EU legal provision concerning positive action was 
the aforementioned Article 2(4) of the equal treatment Directive. This provision was complemented by 
a so-called ‘soft law’ act: Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC of 13 December 1984 on the promo-
tion of positive action for women.25 According to the third recital in the preamble of that recommenda-
tion, existing legal provisions on equal treatment, “which are designed to afford rights to individuals, 
are inadequate for the elimination of all existing inequalities unless parallel action is taken by govern-
ments, both sides of industry and other bodies concerned, to counteract the prejudicial effects on women 
in employment which arise from social attitudes, behaviour and structures”. The Council encouraged 
Member States to adopt positive action policies designed to eliminate existing inequalities affecting 
women’s work and to promote a better balance between the sexes in employment, including appropriate 
general and specific measures in order: (a) to eliminate or counteract the prejudicial effects on women in 
employment or seeking employment which arise from existing attitudes, behaviour and structures based 
on the idea of a traditional division of societal gender roles; (b) to encourage the participation of women 
in various occupations in those sectors of working life where they are currently under-represented, and 
at higher levels of responsibility in order to attain improved use of all human resources. The fact that, 
for a very long period, this non-binding recommendation was the only EU text developing the specific 
use of positive action measures, in tandem with the diluted and imprecise nature of the measures to be 
adopted according to it, reveals the profound divergences in the approach of EU Member States towards 
positive action measures.
The acknowledgement of the legitimacy of pursuing substantive equality by secondary legislation 
has recently been reflected in primary EU law. Article 157 TFEU declares: “With a view to ensuring full 
equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not 
prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in 
order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or com-
pensate for disadvantages in professional careers.” The use of the neutral expression ‘under-represented 
sex’ may be criticized as the article failed to refer to women as the historically disadvantaged group, 
22 Briheche, n. 6 supra, Commisssion v. Greece, n. 7 supra, and Roca Álvarez, n. 8 supra.
23 O.J. L 039, 14/02/1976 0040 - 0042.
24 O.J. L 204, 26/07/2006 0023 - 0036.
25 O.J. L 331, 19/12/1984 0034 - 0035.
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and led to the adoption of Declaration number 28, annex to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
clarifying this point.26 
Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, reproduces the wording of Article 157 
TFEU with some minor deviations, and maintains the possibility of adopting positive action measures 
in favour of the under-represented sex in the labour market. Unfortunately, this is the only reference to 
positive action measures that can be found in the Charter. Thus, concerning substantive equality, the 
analysis of this text reveals a rather disappointing outcome: the absence of an overall recognition of 
the legitimacy of positive action measures to improve the situation of all disadvantaged groups and a 
certain hierarchy in the level of protection provided against the different grounds of discrimination. 
Hence, it apparently establishes a prevalence of gender oriented active labour policies consisting of 
positive action. However, in the practice of Member States social policies, the implementation of 
positive action measures seems to highlight the importance of improving the equal opportunities of 
disabled workers. 
Finally, Article 3 of the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC makes a remission on positive action meas-
ures to the wording of former Article 141(4) ECT (currently Article 157 TFEU). Later in the text, the 
same Directive establishes the duty of Member States to communicate the texts of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of any measures adopted pursuant to Article 157.4 TFEU, as well as reports 
on these measures and their implementation information, every four years. The Commission shall adopt 
and publish a report establishing a comparative assessment of any national measures aimed to overcome 
the under-representation of women in working life. Moreover, the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC rein-
forces positive action policies by imposing an obligation on the Member States to design one or more 
institutions responsible of the promotion, analysis, support, and follow up of equal treatment measures 
aimed to eliminate gender discrimination. The fact that the promotion of equal treatment between men 
and women is mentioned as one of the tasks of these institutions is a step forward in legitimating the 
adoption of this type of measures.
4.2. The concept of positive action in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU
Having listed the legal provisions dealing with positive action measures, the next section is devot-
ed to the analysis of CJEU case law that interprets them. Conclusions should be drawn on the limits for 
the adoption or maintenance of affirmative action measures. This analysis starts with the controversial 
ruling of the CJEU in Kalanke27, afterwards clarified in other related cases. (Barnard, 1998). In Kalanke, 
the Luxemburg Court had to decide if some positive action measures adopted with the aim of improving 
women’s professional situation were compatible with the principle of equality between men and women.
As it has been mentioned above, former Article 2(4) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC provided 
that the directive was to be without prejudice to measures that promote equal opportunity for men and 
women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities. In the much 
debated Kalanke case, the CJEU established that in so far as this provision constituted an exception to 
the principle of equality, it had to be interpreted strictly and was specifically and exclusively designed 
to allow measures which, although apparently giving rise to discrimination on grounds of gender, were 
in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality between men and women that may 
exist in the reality of social life. Therefore, it permitted national measures relating to access to employ-
ment, including promotion, which gave a specific advantage to women in order to improve their ability 
to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men. Nevertheless, in 
Kalanke the CJEU ruled that EU law precludes national rules that give automatic priority on a promo-
tion to women, in sectors where there are fewer women than men at the level of the relevant post. The 
Court held that a national rule guaranteeing women “absolute and unconditional priority” for appoint-
ment or promotion was not permitted by EU law, since it went beyond promoting equal opportunities, 
26 This Declaration states that: “when adopting measures referred to in Article 141(4) of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean EU, Member States should, in the first instance, aim at improving the situation of women in working life.”
27 Kalanke, n. 1 supra.
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substituting it for the “equality of representation” which was only to be attained by providing such 
equality. The Kalanke case aroused criticism amongst academics. Most of the critiques were based on 
the lack of a solid legal argumentation behind the ruling (Brems, 1996; Lanquentin, 1996; Moore, 1996; 
Prechal; Quintanilla Navarro, 1996; Rodríguez-Piñero, 1995; Senden, 1996; and Zuleeg, 1998).
After the uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of quota systems and other positive action meas-
ures in favour of women in employment created by the Kalanke ruling, the European Commission ap-
proved a Communication28 intended to soften the effect of that judgment by proposing an amendment to 
Directive 76/207/EEC to reflect the legal situation after Kalanke and to clarify that despite rigid quotas, 
other positive action measures were authorized by EU law. 
Later, the CJEU position regarding positive action measures was softened in Marschall29 (Banard 
and Hervey, 1998; Brems, 1998; Cabral, 1998,; Mertus, 1998; More, 1999; Rodríguez-Piñero, 1997; 
Sierra Hernaiz, 1998; and Veldman, 1998). In this case, the CJEU noted that, even when candidates are 
equally qualified for a job, male candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates, par-
ticularly due to prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in the workplace. 
So that the mere fact that a male and female candidate are equally qualified does not mean that they have 
the same possibilities. In light of these considerations, in Marschall, the Court held that, unlike Kalanke, 
a national rule which contains a saving clause does not exceed the limits of the exception in the Direc-
tive if it provides for male candidates who are as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee that the 
candidatures will be the subject of an objective assessment which will take account of all criteria specific 
to the individual candidates and will override the priority accorded to female candidates where one or 
more of those criteria tilts the balance in favour of a male candidate. Finally, the Court observed that 
such criteria should not discriminate against the female candidates. Concerning this issue, the CJEU has 
pointed out that the use of criteria such as civil state, ‘breadwinner status’, or company seniority (when 
it is not relevant to performing the tasks of the post) constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of 
gender (Charpertier, 1998).
This less restrictive approach to strict quota systems was reinforced by the CJEU’s decision in 
Badeck30. In this case, the CJEU argued that national rules establishing priority for female candidates in 
promotion, access to temporary posts and training places in sectors where women are under-represented, 
providing that they have equal qualifications and when this rule has been found necessary for ensuring 
compliance with the objectives of the women’s advancement plan, are consistent with EU law. German 
regional legislation assessed in Badeck offers an extensive catalogue of the positive action measures in 
favour of women that are considered to be consistent with the principle of equal treatment and equal 
opportunities for women and men.
The domestic regulation at issue in Badeck ensured that all qualified women would be short-listed 
for an interview, while also encouraging the presence of women in employees’ representative bodies and 
administrative and supervisory bodies. The CJEU observed that these rules were valid only if no reasons 
of greater legal weight were opposed and providing that candidatures were the subject of an ‘objective 
assessment’ which takes into account the specific personal situations of all candidates. In the Court’s 
view in Badeck, the national legislation at issue opted for what is generally known as a “flexible result 
quota”. This system provided for the assessment of the candidates’ suitability, capability and profes-
sional performance with respect to the requirements of the post to be filled or the office to be conferred. 
Accordingly, the CJEU estimated that the priority rule introduced by the national rules was not absolute 
and unconditional since the selection criteria in the case, although formulated in neutral terms in regards 
to gender and thus capable of benefiting men too, generally favoured women. The Court also considered 
that the legislation previewed an obligation to offer preferential treatment over women to some groups, 
namely: former employees who have left the position due to family work, individuals who, for family 
reasons, work on a part-time basis, temporary voluntary soldiers, seriously disabled persons and the 
long-term unemployed.
28 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the interpretation of the judgment 
of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case C-450/93, Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM/96/0088 FINAL.
29 Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-409/95, op. cit.
30 Badeck, n. 3 supra. 
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It is clear that the CJEU ruling in Badeck consolidated the line of reasoning initiated in Kalanke 
and Marschall (Berthou, 2000; Küchhold, 2001). However, the CJEU’s argumentation in Badeck also 
widened the scope of applicability of positive action measures (Ramos Martín, 2000). In Badeck, the 
CJEU reiterated the need for positive action measures to include a flexibility clause in order to prevent 
“intolerable discriminatory treatment” of male workers. In addition, the requirement of objective as-
sessment of the candidatures that considered the specific personal situations of all candidates persisted. 
However, advancements were introduced in regards to a measure establishing preferential access of 
women to training positions in the public sector. According to Badeck, in EU law, the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women does not preclude a national rule for the public service which, in trained 
occupations in which women are under-represented and in which the State does not have a monopoly 
of training, allocates at least half of the training spots to women. The Court considers that, taking an 
overall view of training –public and private sectors–, no male candidate is definitively excluded from 
training. Surprisingly, the CJEU is accepting a rigid quota for access to training positions, as long as it 
is not leading to “absolute rigidity”.
Further, in Abrahamsson31, the CJEU ruled that the equal treatment right established in the Direc-
tive on equal treatment for men and women precludes national legislation by which a candidate for a 
post who belongs to the under-represented sex and possesses sufficient qualifications for that post must 
be chosen in preference to a candidate of the opposite sex who would have otherwise been appointed, 
even when the different between the respective merits of the candidates is not so great as to lead to a 
breach of the requirement of objectivity. The opinion of the Court is that such a selection method is not 
permitted by EU law since the selection of a candidate from amongst those who are sufficiently qualified 
is ultimately based on the mere fact of belonging to the under-represented sex, and this is so even if the 
merits of the selected candidate are inferior to those of a candidate of the opposite sex. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the CJEU’s ruling in Abrahamsson mainly reiterates its previous 
doctrine in Kalanke and Marschall, the importance of this case is that it constitutes the first time the 
CJEU had to deal with interpreting the scope and meaning of paragraph 4 of former Article 141 ECT. 
Some academics hoped that the CJEU would overrule its previous case law and, once the new Treaty 
provision went into force, most of the restrictions to the use of positive action measures would disap-
pear. However, the CJEU took a more conservative approach and continued along the lines of Kalanke 
and Marschall (Numhauser-Henning, 2000 and Ramos Martín, 2000).
Another case regarding the interpretation of the derogation to the right of equal treatment between 
men and women is Lommers.32 Here, the CJEU deals with subsidised nursery places made available by 
the Dutch Ministry of agriculture to its staff. The Ministry, aiming to tackle extensive under-represen-
tation of women within it and in a context characterised by a proven insufficiency of proper, affordable 
care facilities, reserved places in subsidised nurseries only for children of female officials, whilst male 
officials had access to them only in emergency situations, to be determined by the employer. The Dutch 
Ministry’s measure was considered to form part of the restricted concept of equality of opportunities in 
so far as it was not places of employment which were reserved for women, but specific working condi-
tions designed to facilitate the pursuit of their careers. 
The CJEU noted that the Dutch Ministry’s measure might a priory assist the perpetuation of tra-
ditional role division between men and women, arguing that, the promotion of equality of opportunity 
between men and women pursued by the introduction of a measure benefiting working mothers could 
also be achieved if its scope is extended to include working fathers. However, the Court finally con-
cluded that the measure at issue fell within the scope of the positive action exception found in the equal 
treatment for men and women Directive, taking into account the insufficiency of supply in the number 
of available nursery places and the possibility for employers to grant requests from male officials in 
emergency situations. The national measure is considered to be in accordance with the principle of pro-
portionality in so far as the exception in favour of male officials is construed as allowing those of them 
who take care of their children on their own to have access to those nursery places under the same con-
31 Abrahamsson, n. 4 supra.
32 Lommers, n. 5 supra.
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ditions as female officials. Moreover, the Court sustained that the argument that women are more likely 
to interrupt their careers in order to take care of their young children no longer had the same relevance. 
In Lommers, the CJEU overruled its previous case law from Hofmann.33 In this case, the CJEU 
ruled that the Directive on equal treatment for men and women left discretion open to Member States 
concerning the social measures to be adopted in order to offset the disadvantages which women, as 
compared to men, suffer with regards to employment retention. Such measures are closely linked to the 
general system of social protection in the various Member States. Therefore, Member States were sup-
posed to enjoy a reasonable margin of discretion regarding both the nature of the protective measures 
and the detailed arrangements for their implementation. That margin was narrowed by the CJEU’s deci-
sion in Lommers. Taking into account that the argument that women interrupt their careers more often 
than men in order to take care of children is no longer as relevant from the CJEU’s point of view, these 
kinds of measures need to be conformed with the principle of proportionality. This new reasoning has 
been maintained in more recent CJEU case law such as Briheche,34 Commission versus Greece,35 and 
Roca Álvarez36 to justify the extension of privileges that were previously enjoyed only by female work-
ers, to men, so long as they were also involved in caring for their young children.
4.3. New EU Proposal: Directive on Quotas for Women in Company Boards
Since 2010, the European Commission has adopted several new initiatives to promote gender 
equality for women and men such as the Women’s Charter and the Strategy for equality between women 
and men 2010-2015.37 These actions aim to give a new impulse to promoting more women in decision-
making positions. For instance, the Commission monitors progress made towards achieving the 25% 
female target in top-level decision-making positions in academia, where studies have shown that women 
have lower promotion probabilities than men (Groeneveld, Tijdens, and Van Kleef, 2012).
In November 2012, the European Commission presented a proposal for an EU Directive to 
achieve improved gender balance on the corporate boards of European companies.38 The overall goal 
of the proposed Directive is to attain a minimum representation of 40% of the under-represented sex in 
non-executive board-member positions in publicly listed companies, with the exception of small and 
medium enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises are defined as companies with less than 250 
employees and an annual worldwide turnover that does not exceed 50 million EUR, or an annual balance 
sheet of less than 43 million euros.
This initiative dealing with enhanced equality for women and men in decision making at an en-
terprise level is also supported by the European Parliament in its resolutions of 6 July 201139 and 13 
March 2012.40
Currently, boards are dominated by one gender: 85% of non-executive board members and 91.1% 
of executive board members are men (European Commission, 2012). Despite some initiatives at national 
(binding legislation adopted in France, Belgium and Italy, and non-binding quota systems in Spain and 
the Netherlands) and EU level, this unbalanced situation has not changed significantly over recent years. 
The proposed Directive establishes an objective of a 40% presence of the under-represented sex 
among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges by January 2010 for compa-
nies in the private sector. For State owned companies, the implementation period will be two years 
33 Case184/83, Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, [1984] ECR I-03047.
34 Briheche, n. 6 supra.
35 Commission v. Greece, n. 7 supra.
36 Roca Álvarez, n. 8 supra.
37 COM(2010) 491 final.
38 EU Proposal for a Directive on female quota on company boards, n. 9 supra.
39 European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2011 on women and business leadership (2010/2115(INI)) http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0330+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, acceded on 
01.06.2013.
40 European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2012 on equality between women and men in the European Union 
- 2011 (2011/2244(INI)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0069+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN acceded on 01.06.2013.
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less (January 2018). The Directive requires companies to have a transparent recruitment procedure for 
non-executive directors. Companies having a lower share (less than 40%) of the under-represented sex 
among the non-executive directors will be required to make appointments to those positions based on 
a comparative analysis of the qualifications of each candidate, by applying clear, gender-neutral, and 
unambiguous criteria. Given equal qualification, priority shall be given to the under-represented sex. 
This priority would not apply if “an objective assessment taking into account of all criteria specific to 
the individual candidates tilts the balance in favour of the candidate of the other sex.”
Furthermore, the proposed Directive establishes a rule for sharing the burden of proof that is 
similar to the formula used by existing anti-discrimination and equal treatment Directives. It provides 
that, when an unsuccessful candidate of the under-represented sex establishes before a court “facts from 
which it may be presumed that that candidate was equally qualified as the appointed candidate of the 
other sex”, then, it is up to the company to prove that it did not violate the rules established by the Direc-
tive for the selection of non-executive directors. 
The wording of the Directive concerning the rules for the selection of non-executive directors 
follows nearly literally the case law of the CJEU on “positive action” for women in employment, ex-
plained above. The Commission has been careful to closely follow CJEU case law in order to avoid 
non-compliance with the CJEU’s position regarding positive action for men and women. It requires a 
transparent procedure with analysis of the individual applications, giving priority to a female applicant 
only if her qualifications are equal to those of the male applicant. Moreover, the CJEU’s case law per-
mits preferential treatment when one gender is under-represented in a specific professional category, 
therefore, until reaching a balance of 50% of members of that gender, while the Commission’s proposal 
allows for preference to be granted for only up to 40% of the positions at the company board. Thus it 
can be concluded that the proposed Directive is likely to be acceptable also from the point of view of the 
strict scrutiny applied by the CJEU to positive action measures in favour of the under-represented sex.
The Directive also includes a requirement for companies to annually provide information to the 
competent national authorities regarding gender representation of their boards, as well as the measures 
taken to fulfil the obligation of a transparent recruitment process. This information should be made pub-
lic. Besides, if the company does not meet the objectives established by the Directive, it must explain 
the reasons for the failure and the steps taken to correct that situation. Moreover, the proposed Direc-
tive states that Member States will have to lay down effective, appropriate, and dissuasive sanctions for 
companies that are in breach of the Directive.
The proposed Directive aims to be a temporary measure until a better balance is reached between 
men and women in decision-making. Thus, the proposal anticipates its expiration in 2028 and provides 
for an evaluation mechanism starting in 2017. The proposal is expected to apply to approximately 5000 
listed companies in the European Union. 
In October 2013, the committee on gender equality and the committee of legal affairs of the Euro-
pean Parliament approved the proposal for a Directive establishing an objective of 40% females amongst 
on-executive members of company boards. This proposal is now being discussed at the Council. 
5. Conclusions
The overview of the CJEU’s case law regarding positive action measures reveals a very strict the 
interpretation of this concept. In addition, the significance of positive action measures has not been the 
object of solid legal argumentation. The main problem is that the CJEU’s approach to this concept relies 
heavily on undetermined expressions such as: ‘rigid result quota’, ‘flexible result quota’ and ‘saving 
clauses allowing an objective assessment’. These terms create legal uncertainty regarding the use of 
positive action measures since they have been established by the CJEU as the parameters of the legiti-
macy of affirmative action measures without previously defining their full significance. Instead of using 
such obscure terminology, the Court of Justice could emphasize the need to respect the proportionality 
principle when applying the positive action measure. The simple maxim: ‘A positive action measure in 
favour of disadvantaged groups can be adopted in order to achieve substantive equality providing that its 
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respects the principles of rationality and proportionality’ summarizes the requirements for compliance 
with EU law imposed by the CJEU’s interpretation. This clearer formula may be deduced from several 
CJEU decisions, namely, the cases Lommers41 and Briheche42. In these rulings the CJEU focuses on 
respect of the proportionality principle as the key element for the validity of positive action measures.
Despite the fact that the Court of Justice has repeatedly praised substantive equality as the ultimate 
goal of EU law, its case law has traditionally reflected a rigid and formal concept of equality. From the 
observation of EU Law, it can be deduced that positive action measures in favour of female workers have 
been admitted only on a very limited basis. A provision allowing for the use of positive action measures 
in favour of women was introduced in the 70s by the first Directive on equal treatment and opportunities 
for men and women. At the end of the 90s, a similar provision was included in the Treaty. Finally, after the 
inclusion of a reference to positive action measures in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the 
recast Directive on gender equality in employment, the notion of substantive equality has been strength-
ened. The pursuit of ‘full equality in practice’ is explicitly stated in these legal measures when legitimating 
the use of pro-active measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to the worker’s gender. 
Notwithstanding the relevance of these developments, the fact that this sort of favourable treatment is still 
considered an exception to the equal treatment rule rather than an intrinsic requirement of the equality prin-
ciple hinders progress in this area. At the EU level, equality of opportunities is still considered equivalent 
to substantive equality. It may be argued that this assumption represents a misreading of the essence of real 
equality. Equal opportunity policies lead to situations where some groups are assisted in order to achieve 
access to education, training, and employment, but they are not granted equal results in relationship with 
their individual capacities. This type of policies is not very effective in removing the negative stereotypes 
that are deeply rooted in the society. In this context, an alternative approach is feasible, to consider positive 
action as a useful instrument to prevent social exclusion of minorities, –informed by dignity, restitution and 
redistribution as values linked to equality– rather than an exceptional equal opportunities policy (Fredman, 
2001). From this perspective, positive action is considered to be a corollary of the Member States’ obliga-
tion to promote real equality among their citizens, from an individual as well as a collective perspective, by 
removing the obstacles that hinder their full participation in political, economic and social life.
In EU law, positive action is still understood to be an exception rather than a concrete substan-
tiation of equality. This approach seems to forget that the EU has a positive responsibility to promote 
equality between men and women and combat social discrimination (Article 3 TUE and Article 8 
TFEU). Guidance on this issue is provided by international instruments such as the UN Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which expressly encourages the adop-
tion of “measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, 
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men” in its article 3. Constitutional and international standards may 
be relied upon to adopt measures aimed to counteract the labour market inequalities that hindrance the 
career advancement of certain social groups. In this context, equality law is not just about how to regu-
late employment; “it is about how to create the socio-economic, community and labour market condi-
tions for social equality” (Sheppard, 2012). From this point of view, pro-active measures, rather than a 
restrictively interpreted exception to the equality principle, should be considered to be an effective tool 
for achieving social peace, social justice and economic welfare for all. (Duer, 2005).
When applying positive action measures, attention should be paid to the emerging clash of in-
terests and rights between the individual right to equal treatment and the collective right to ‘de facto’ 
equality. Due to this tension between the pursuit of substantive equality and the legitimate individual 
rights and expectations, the boundaries of positive action policies need to be precisely determined. First, 
these policies should only be adopted when there is objective evidence of the existence of a homogenous 
group of individuals suffering a generalized discriminatory treatment. Second, the temporary character 
of the proactive measure should be acknowledged. In other words, the use of proactive measures should 
end when social imbalance is corrected. Finally, all affirmative action measures must comply with the 
41 Lommers, n. 5 supra.
42 Briheche, n. 6 supra.
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proportionality principle.43 Therefore, the adopted measures should be necessary and appropriate to 
overcome the situation of discriminatory disadvantage and should only be used when there are no other 
less harmful alternative means for the rights or interest of other individuals potentially affected by them. 
On the one hand, the new EU proposal for a Directive establishing a binding quota for women in 
companies could be interpreted as a reaction to the increasing willingness of some EU Member States to 
adopt broader affirmative action policies concerning women. In several EU countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, among others) positive action measures 
are used in a widespread manner and are covered by legislation, as well as by constitutional provisions 
(Selanec and Sende, 2011). On the other hand, the new EU proposed Directive clearly results from a 
frustration with the insufficient effects of gender equality law and policies at both European and national 
levels and shows the concern of the European Commission and European Parliament regarding the lack 
of quick progress in this field. Considering that some Member States governments have expressed their 
opposition to the approval of the proposal for a Directive on female quotas on company boards, the 
chances of success of this legal text at the co-decision process is uncertain. Nonetheless, the mere fact 
that there is a proposal on the table has stimulated debate on the need to adopt more ambitious positive 
action strategies and may serve as an impulse for several legally binding national measures designed to 
improve the gender balance in decision making positions. 
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